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The Drug War Comes to a Highway Near
You: Police Power to Effectuate Highway
"Narcotics Checkpoints" Under the
Federal and State Constitutions
Chris Braeske*
On the night of July 30, 1992, law enforcement authorities set
up a "narcotics checkpoint" on Interstate 35W south of Minneapolis,
Minnesota, randomly stopping 650 cars.1 This checkpoint led to
drug charges against seven people for possessing small amounts of
marijuana.2 While Minnesota authorities have previously used this
tactic to facilitate arrests of drivers under the influence of alcohol,3
this was the first use of such a checkpoint in Minnesota to search
vehicles for illegal drugs.4
Drug checkpoints are patterned after drunk driving highway
checkpoints which the U.S. Supreme Court recently validated in
Michigan v. Sitz.5 The Minnesota Court of Appeals has used the
Sitz framework to evaluate drunk driving checkpoint stops by Min-
nesota law enforcement agencies.6 Because this is the first use of
the checkpoint stop tactic for the purpose of drug law enforcement,
however, these criminal cases are cases of first impression in Min-
nesota on the question of whether such searches violate state or
federal constitutional rights. This article argues that evidence pro-
* B.S., Psychology, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 1989; J.D. ex-
pected, University of Minnesota, 1994.
1. 650 Cars Stopped at Narcotics Checkpoint; 7 Tagged for Marijuana at 1-35W
and 106th St., STAR TRmuNE (MNEm-oms), Aug. 1, 1992, at 4B [hereinafter 650
Cars Stopped]; Jill Hodges, Drivers on Drugs Are New Target; Narcotics Checks
Starting in State, STAR TRBUNE (MINNAPoIs), Aug. 24, 1992, at 1A.
2. 650 Cars Stopped, supra note 1, at 4B; Hodges, supra note 1, at 1A.
3. See generally infra, part III.C (discussing Minnesota Courts' treatment of
drunk driving).
4. Very few courts have addressed the issue of drug checkpoints. Part II.Aiii.
of this article will discuss a North Dakota Supreme Court decision, State v. Everson,
474 N.W.2d 695 (N.D. 1991), which upheld a drug trafficking checkpoint as constitu-
tional under the U.S. Constitution. Courts have also held that drug checkpoints are
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Barcia, 562 A.2d 246
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989); U.S. v. Ramos, 733 F.Supp 260 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
5. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
6. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
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duced by drug checkpoint searches are inadmissible under both
U.S. and Minnesota law.7
Part I of this article details the procedures used by law en-
forcement authorities in effectuating a narcotics checkpoint. Part
II argues that under the Sitz framework such a checkpoint violates
the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and that such
checkpoints necessarily rely upon the uncontrolled discretion of po-
lice officers, resulting in racial and class-based discrimination.
Part III posits that regardless of federal law, such stops violate the
Minnesota Constitution.
I. The Minnesota Narcotics Checkpoint
On July 30, 1992, Minnesota law enforcement authorities in-
stituted a "narcotics checkpoint," randomly stopping drivers on an
exit ramp leaving Interstate 35W.8 Over thirty law enforcement
officers were involved.9 The law enforcement authorities kept the
strategy and planning for this checkpoint confidential.lO Every mo-
torist stopped was given a written statement informing him or her
7. Violations of an individual's Fourth Amendment rights are remedied by ex-
cluding the evidence obtained by that violation. See 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDmENT § 1.1 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1992)
(describing the origins and purposes of the exclusionary rule).
8. Hodges, supra note 1, at 1A; 650 Cars Stopped, supra note 1, at 4B.
9. Telephone Interview with Lt. Dunledy, Hennepin County Sheriff's Depart-
ment, Narcotics Division (Feb. 5, 1993) [hereinafter Telephone Interview with Lt.
Dunledy].
10. Tom Kelly, Presentation on Pre-trial Motions, Search and Seizure (Drug
Roadblocks) (outline of presentation on file with the Journal of Law & Inequality).
However, a typical police roadblock has been described as follows:
Generally, the police provide some form of advance notice of the
roadblock. Higher ranking officials, not the officers in the field, choose
the roadblock sites, and these choices are made according to a written
policy. Most roadblocks are placed along major highways, but recently
police in Washington, D.C. have located them in residential neighbor-
hoods. They are usually conducted for a number of hours, but less than
a full day. A substantial number of officers ordinarily man a roadblock,
and they often represent an array of federal, state, or local agencies.
Some police roadblocks entail stopping of all vehicles, but since road-
blocks can cause traffic congestion, many involve the stopping of cars in
a sequence, such as every fifth car or every twentieth car.
Once a driver is pulled over, the police officers ask to see the
driver's license and vehicle registration. Roadblock stops provide an op-
portunity for officers to peer into a vehicle at a time when the driver
has not anticipated official inspection. Thus, in many driver's license
checkpoints, officers can detect drug or alcohol violations simply by be-
ing alert to them .... the investigative technique of choice is the volun-
tary consent search. Prior to conducting a consent search, motorists
are often asked to sign a "consent search form."
Sandra Guerra, Criminal Law: Domestic Drug Interdiction Operations: Finding
the Balance, 82 J. CRIm. L. & CRimiNOLOGY 1109, 1132-33 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
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of the purpose of the checkpoint. 1 The original aim of the check-
point was to stop every car passing through it, but in order to main-
tain the flow of traffic, officers stopped every third or fourth car for
questioning.' 2 Both a uniformed police officer and a narcotics
agent questioned the driver of each stopped vehicle.' 3 The officers
also had trained drug sniffing dogs available at the checkpoint.14
The authorities placed signs announcing the checkpoint along
the highway just before the 106th Street exit.15 The officers con-
ducted the operation on the 106th Street exit ramp in an attempt to
examine those trying to avoid the checkpoint.16 The officers asked
each driver if he or she lived in the area.17 An unsatisfactory or
suspicious answer to this question led to further investigation.' 8
Several of the checkpoint officers were assigned to monitor vehicles
approaching the checkpoint and to pursue any vehicle making a
suspicious action, such as an abrupt turn or an illegal U-turn.19
Of the approximately 650 cars that passed through the check-
point from 7:00 to 11:00 p.m., 20 officers diverted approximately fifty
cars out of the flow of traffic for further questioning.2' Of the fifty
vehicles pulled aside, officers "tagged" seven individuals for pos-
sessing small amounts of marijuana. 22 According to an officer on
the scene, officers tagged some of the individuals after finding mari-
juana in plain view23 during the stop, while in other cases, officers
tagged individuals after finding marijuana pursuant to a consen-
sual search of the individuals' vehicles. 24
11. See Kelly, supra note 10.
12. Id. Telephone Interview with Lt. Dunledy, supra note 9.
13. Telephone Interview with Lt. Dunledy, supra note 9.
14. Id.
15. Hodges, supra note 1, at 1A.
16. Id. ("A sign on the highway warned drivers of a checkpoint ahead, and a
number of motorists probably gambled wrong and got off at the exit, only to find that
the narcotics checkpoint was there, not on the highway.")
17. Telephone Interview with Lt. Dunledy, supra note 9.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 650 Cars Stopped, supra note 1, at 4B.
21. Telephone Interview with Lt. Dunledy, supra note 9.
22. Hodges, supra note 1, at 1A. Possession of a small amount of marijuana is a
petty misdemeanor in Minnesota, punishable by a fine of up to $200 and participa-
tion in a drug education program. Mnn. STAT. § 152.027, Subd. 4. (1992). Posses-
sion of over 1.4 grams of marijuana in the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle
is a misdemeanor. MINN.STAT. § 152.027, Subd. 3. (1992).
23. If an officer is lawfully present, he or she may observe items in "plain view,"
but in order to seize evidence in this manner, it must be immediately apparent to the
police that they have evidence in front of them. 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 7, at
§ 2.2(a). See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,465-66 (1971); State v. Dick-
erson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 844-45 (Minn. 1992).
24. Hodges, supra note 1 at 1A
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The exact details of this checkpoint are not known because law
enforcement authorities have classified the procedure, strategy,
and planning of it as "confidential."25 However, the main charac-
teristics of this Minnesota checkpoint parallel the general model of
a search-oriented checkpoint that is detailed in this article. The
most important feature of such a checkpoint is the "point man" who
is responsible for deciding which vehicles will be detained for fur-
ther investigation.26 Although this individual may act based on cri-
teria relating to the objectives of the checkpoint, the procedure
gives the officer wide discretion to select vehicles for further police
attention. 27
II. The Minnesota Narcotics Checkpoint Violates the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
In the much criticized 28 case Michigan v. Sitz,29 the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld a drunk driving checkpoint seizure30 which
the Michigan Court of Appeals previously had found to violate the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.31 In reversing the
Michigan Court, the Supreme Court applied the Brown v. Texas 32
25. See Kelly, supra note 10 and accompanying text. Although the procedure,
strategy, and planning of this checkpoint are "confidential," law enforcement author-
ities must respond to any discovery request by a criminal defendant charged as a
result of this checkpoint and must provide information regarding the purpose of and
methods used in the checkpoint operation. The author of this article has attempted
to find any of these defendants but has had no success.
26. A recent Minnesota District Court opinion examined a "fish and game"
checkpoint conducted by Minnesota authorities, including the State Patrol, which
was involved in the narcotics checkpoint. See Minnesota v. Baumgartner, Pine Co.
File No. K2 92 0992 (1993). This checkpoint involved a "greeter" who separated ve-
hicles to be given further scrutiny. Id.
27. During the Baumgartner checkpoint, the officer decided which drivers to de-
tain further based on responses as to whether the driver had been hunting or fish-
ing. However, the "greeter" was given discretion to stop any vehicle upon evidence of
other illegality, such as intoxication or where the driver exhibited "extreme nervous-
ness." Id. The narcotics checkpoint in Everson also relied upon a "point man." See
infra note 74 and accompanying text; State v. Everson, 474 N.W.2d 695 (N.D. 1991).
28. See Nadine Strossen, Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz: A Roadblock to
Meaningful Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Rights, 41 HAsTINGs L.J. 285
(1991); see also Guerra, supra note 10; Troy Gilchrist, Michigan Department of
State Police v. Sitz: Placing a Road Block on Individual Freedom, 12 HAMLnE J.
Pus. L. & POLIcy 301 (1991); 4 W. LAFAVE, supra note 7, at § 10.8.
29. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
30. Id. at 455.
31. Sitz v. Dept. of State Police, 429 N.W. 2d 180, 185 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). The
Michigan Court applied the balancing test of Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
Sitz II, 429 N.W.2d at 182. For discussion of the Brown balancing test, see infra
notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
32. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
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Fourth Amendment balancing test.33 This test involves three
prongs: 1) the state's interest in highway safety; 2) the effectiveness
of the checkpoint in achieving that goal; and 3) the level of intrusion
on the individual's privacy caused by the checkpoint 34 - both ob-
jective3 5 and subjective. 36 The test is applied by balancing the
state's interest against the effectiveness and level of intrusion, the
latter two factors weighing against the constitutionality of the
seizure. 37 Also, the checkpoint operation must be governed by pro-
cedures or guidelines that circumscribe the amount of discretion
given to the officer to decide which motorists may be detained and
investigated during the operation.3 8
The Sitz Court emphasized the compelling state interest in
combatting drunk driving, which leads to thousands of deaths on
the highway every year.39 On the other side of the balancing test,
the Court found that the effectiveness of the checkpoint was accept-
able,40 and the level of intrusion upon motorists was slight.41 The
33. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450. The Brown Court held that the brief detention of an
individual by a police officer violated the Fourth Amendment because the officer had
no "specific basis for believing [the individual was] involved in criminal activity."
Brown, 443 U.S. at 52. The clear holding of Brown is not distinguished by the Sitz
Court: "In the absence of any basis for suspecting [an individual] of misconduct, the
balance between the public interest and [the individual's] right to personal security
and privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police interference." Id. The Sitz decision
also ostensibly relied upon U.S. v. Martinez-Fuente, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), which up-
held a fixed, permanent border checkpoint with the purpose of detecting illegal
aliens. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450. The Sitz Court did not address the distinctions be-
tween the Martinez-Fuerte checkpoint and a roving, temporary drunk driving check-
point. See Strossen, supra note 28, at 307-08 (arguing that neither Brown nor
Martinez-Fuerte supports the Court's decision in Sitz).
34. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979)).
35. "Objective" intrusion is defined as the "duration of the seizure and the inten-
sity of the investigation." Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452.
36. "Subjective" intrusion is generally referred to as "the potential to generate
fear and surprise in motorists." Id.
37. Id. at 448-49.
38. Id. at 454 ("the Court... has insisted that the discretion of the official in the
field be circumscribed, at least to some extent").
39. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451. See Guerra, supra note 10, at 1137 ("Previously, the
Court had upheld only suspicionless searches and seizures in limited cases where
the government could show some 'special governmental needs, beyond the need for
law enforcement.' In advocating the 'need' for sobriety checkpoints, the government
could show no need beyond the normal need for law enforcement. The Court simply
emphasized the severity of the drunk driving problem in this country").
40. This prong of the test was satisfied simply by the fact that two drunken driv-
ers, or 1.5% of the motorists who passed through the checkpoint, were arrested for
drunken driving. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455.
41. The Court analyzed the intrusion upon the motorists by first gauging the
"objective" intrusion, which was found to be slight - the average detention of each
vehicle which passed through the checkpoint was 25 seconds. Id. at 444, 451-52. See
infra part II.C for further discussion of objective intrusion. Next, the Court consid-
ered the "subjective" intrusion, initially defined as the potential of the checkpoint to
generate "fear and surprise" in approaching motorists, and held that this intrusion
1993]
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narcotics checkpoint instituted in Minnesota, however, differs from
the Sitz drunk driving checkpoint with respect to all three of these
criteria.
A. The State's Interest in Drug Checkpoints: Three
Possible Rationales
The state's interest in instituting a drug checkpoint is inher-
ently different from a drunk driving checkpoint. While the primary
motivation behind the Minnesota drug checkpoints is not entirely
clear,42 three possible rationales can be suggested. The first possi-
ble state goal in enacting a drug checkpoint is to apprehend drivers
impaired by drugs.43 The second possible rationale is to apprehend
individuals who possess personal amounts of illegal drugs. The
third possible state interest is to intercept drug trafficking and to
apprehend drug traffickers.44 Each of these state interests, how-
ever, differs substantially from the Sitz interest in combatting
drunken driving.
i. The State's Interest in Apprehending Drug Impaired
Drivers
Minnesota recently demonstrated its interest in apprehending
drug-impaired drivers by creating a program to train law enforce-
ment officials as Drug Recognition Experts (DRE's).45 At least one
DRE officer was present at the Minnesota checkpoint.46 Minnesota
DRE officers are given seventy-two hours of specialized training,
followed by a certification process.47 The drug evaluation proce-
dure administered by a DRE occurs after a suspect has been ar-
did not prohibit a nighttime, temporary, police checkpoint. Id. at 452-53 ("The 'fear
and surprise' to be considered are not the natural fear of one who has been drinking
... but, rather, the fear and surprise engendered in law abiding motorists at the
nature of the stop."). See infra part II.C. for further discussion of subjective
intrusion.
42. See supra part I. It is not entirely clear that even the officers involved were
fully aware of the parameters of the checkpoint operation. In the words of Officer
Thompson, Hennepin County Sheriffs Department, Narcotics Division, "... . we were
looking for drugs and anything in between." Telephone Interview with Officer
Thompson (Feb. 5, 1993).
43. MINN. STAT. § 161.121 (1992) criminalizes both driving under the influence of
alcohol and driving under the influence of a "controlled substance." Id.
44. See North Dakota v. Everson, 474 N.W.2d 695, 701 (N.D. 1991) (recognizing
the state's interest in apprehending drug traffickers).
45. Karen Herland, Introduction to Minnesota's Drug Recognition Program,
Minnesota CLE Presentation at 1992 Fundamentals of DWI Prosecution Seminar, 4-
5 (October 29, 1992) (on file with the Journal of Law & Inequality).
46. Telephone Interview with Karen Sprattler, Minnesota Dept. of Safety (No-
vember, 1992).
47. Herland, supra note 45, at 5-6.
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rested and brought to the police station.48 The Minnesota drug
influence evaluation incorporates the standardized field sobriety
tests49 but adds many additional tests, as well as extensive ques-
tioning of the suspect. 50
The state interest in apprehending drug impaired drivers re-
flects the Sitz interest in highway safety.51 In opposition to the
stark figures presented to justify the state interest in combatting
drunk driving,52 however, similar data does not exist to justify a
state interest in apprehending drug influenced drivers. 53 Further-
48. A controlled environment is necessary to perform several of the steps in the
drug influence evaluation. For example, a darkroom examination is one of the steps
in the process. See infra note 50 and accompanying text. This procedure contrasts
with the blood alcohol content (breathalyzer) test, which can be administered at the
site of the checkpoint.
49. Herland, supra note 45, at 5. The three standard field sobriety tests (SFSTs)
used by Minnesota officers are the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN), the one leg
stand, and the walk and turn test. Id.
50. Id. at 7-10. The arresting officer calls a DRE when the officer feels that the
suspect in custody was driving under the influence of drugs. The DRE then adminis-
ters an evaluation consisting of 12 steps:
1. Breath Alcohol Test.
2. Interview of Arresting Officer. The DRE conducts an interview
with the arresting officer regarding the suspect's conduct and evi-
dence found.
3. Preliminary Examination and First Pulse. The DRE asks the sus-
pect 10 questions regarding his/her condition (e.g. "What have you
eaten today?," "What have you been drinking?") and takes the sus-
pect's pulse for the first of three times.
4. Eye Examinations.
5. Divided Attention Psychophysical Tests. These tests include the
standard field sobriety tests. See supra note 49 and accompanying
text.
6. Vital Signs and Second Pulse.
7. Dark Room Examination and Ingestion Examination. The DRE
check the suspect's eyes under four different lighting conditions
and examines the suspect's nose and mouth for signs of drugs.
8. Examination of Muscle Tone.
9. Check for Injection Sites and Third Pulse.
10. Questioning as to Drug Use.
11. Opinion of the Evaluator.
12. Toxicological Examination. The DRE takes a urine sample from
the suspect.
Id.
51. It has been suggested that the Sitz opinion can be explained in terms of the
state's interest in public safety, as opposed to its interest in apprehending criminals.
See State v. Everson, 474 N.W.2d 695, 705 (N.D. 1991) (Levine, J., dissenting). See
also infra note 81 and accompanying text.
52. "Drunk drivers cause an annual death toll of over 25,000." Sitz, 496 U.S. at
451. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
53. The primary purpose of the Minnesota DRE program is to "recognize impair-
ment in drivers who are under the influence of drugs other than or in addition to
alcohol." Herland, supra note 45, at 1. The purpose of the DRE officer, therefore, is
to compile information necessary for the conviction of drug impaired drivers. See
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: IN-
NOVATIONS, TECHNOLOGIES AID EFFORTS AGAINST IMPAMED DIVING (Jan., 1991.)
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more, the drug influence evaluation's success in identifying drug
impaired individuals is largely untested54 and is significantly more
invasive than an alcohol test.5 5
ii. The State's Interest in Apprehending Individuals Who
Possess Personal Amounts of Illegal Drugs
The state interest in finding small, personal amounts of illegal
drugs provides the weakest of the three rationales for such a stop.
First, unlike the Sitz interest in combatting drunk driving,56 the
state interest in finding possession amounts5 7 of drugs is not re-
lated to highway safety. The use of highway interdiction is ration-
ally related to the task of apprehending drug impaired drivers,58
reflecting the state's interest in highway safety.59 However, a high-
way checkpoint targeting individuals with personal amounts of
drugs tenuously stretches this connection. Such a checkpoint relies
simply upon the "drug problem" as a rationale for a specialized, in-
quisitorial, and invasive police seizure.6 0
Second, the large scale use of law enforcement resources to
conduct inquisitorial operations for the sole purpose of finding
small, misdemeanor amounts of illegal drugs is a gross misalloca-
tion of police resources. Highway checkpoints are major police op-
erations, normally involving dozens of officers.6 1 This
concentration of officers undoubtedly reduces police attention to
other duties during the checkpoint.62
Since the DRE program is relatively new and untested by the courts, it has not yet
produced any meaningful statistics regarding drivers impaired by drugs.
54. See infra part II.C.
55. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
56. Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990); see also supra note 51 and accom-
panying text.
57. As opposed to distribution or trafficking amounts, possession amounts refers
to small quantities of drugs for personal use. The Minnesota statutes which
criminalize drug possession do not specifically make this distinction but instead cre-
ate a five-tiered system based in part upon on the quantity of different drugs seized
and "intent to sell." MiNN. STAT. §§ 152.021-.025 (1992).
58. Alcohol checkpoints, such as the one validated in Sitz, are also rationally
related to the state's interest in highway safety.
59. See supra part II.A.i.
60. Stopping a vehicle at a highway checkpoint constitutes a Fourth Amend-
ment seizure. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450.
61. For example, the Minnesota narcotics checkpoint on July 31, 1992, utilized
over 30 law enforcement officers. Telephone Interview with Lt. Dunledy, supra note
9.
62. See Gilchrist, supra note 28, at § B.2 (arguing that the costs of high concen-
trations of officers during a checkpoint operation cause neglect of other police duties
and weighs against the "effectiveness" prong of the Brown-Sitz balancing test); see
also infra part II.B.
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Furthermore, the argument that small time drug users are
also likely to be under the influence is erroneous. As discussed
supra, drivers under the influence of drugs have not been shown to
be a substantial threat as opposed to drunk drivers, and an entirely
different, complex and more invasive system is used to identify
drug impaired drivers, as evidenced by the Minnesota DRE
program. 6 3
Finally, the intrusion necessary to locate these easily conceal-
able substances rises far above that of a drunken driving check-
point.64 As discussed infra, drug checkpoints are inherently more
invasive than alcohol checkpoints, such as the one upheld in Sitz.65
While the Sitz Court found a compelling state interest in high-
way safety,66 and there is arguably a great state interest in inter-
cepting significant drug traffic,6 7 the interest in finding possession
amounts of drugs in individuals' automobiles falls well short of the
level necessary to justify the heightened intrusion of a highway
drug checkpoint.
iii. The State Interest in Combatting Drug Traffic: State
v. Everson
In State v. Everson,6 8 the North Dakota Supreme Court up-
held a checkpoint operation that had the primary purpose of inter-
cepting drug traffickers.6 9 The Everson court used the Sitz
framework to evaluate the checkpoint and found that "the state
may validly conduct a checkpoint for the purpose of apprehending
drug traffickers, a societal harm at least equal in magnitude to
drunk driving."70 The Everson checkpoint, however, substantially
differed from the checkpoint that the U.S. Supreme Court validated
in Sitz.
The Everson checkpoint coincided with a nearby motorcycle
rally and occurred on a major interstate highway. 7 1 Although the
63. See supra part II.A.i.
64. The Sitz balancing test weighs the state interest against the intrusion upon
the motorist. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449. A checkpoint to search for personal amounts of
illegal drugs would involve not only a questionable state interest but also a more
invasive procedure than is necessary for the identification of drunk drivers, includ-
ing official pressure for consent to search, dog sniffs, and physical searches of the
vehicle. See infra part II.C.
65. See infra part II.C.
66. See supra part II.A (discussing the undisputed state interest in preventing
drunk driving).
67. See infra part IAWii.
68. 474 N.W.2d 695 (N.D. 1991).
69. Id. at 704.
70. Id. at 701.
71. Id. at 696.
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checkpoint was conducted under the pretext of a "multi-purpose
highway checkpoint,"72 the trial court found that the true purpose
of the operation was to search for drugs.73 During the operation of
the checkpoint, all traffic was stopped by the "point man," who had
the option of sending any vehicle to either the "inspection area" for
a vehicle-safety inspection or to the "search area" which was staffed
by drug enforcement officers. 74 All officers at the checkpoint were
given a "drug courier profile containing a list of 'indicators' of nar-
cotics traffickers."75 As a result of the checkpoint, 1,023 vehicles
were stopped and thirty-four were searched, resulting in two con-
trolled substance arrests.76
The Everson Court attempts to draw a parallel between drunk
driving and drug trafficking to justify a checkpoint operation, but it
overlooks distinctions between the two. The death toll on the high-
ways due to drunken driving is not disputed in Sitz and is in fact
supported by overwhelming statistics.77 The Everson Court, how-
72. Id.
73. Id. at 698. This finding was made in part because the "point man" or lead
officer who had "unconstrained discretion" as to which vehicles were to be searched
was a criminal investigator rather than a traffic officer. Id.
74. Id. at 696-97.
75. Id. at 697. This "profile" could arguably validate the search of almost any
vehicle which the officers wished to search. See supra part I.A.iv. The "indicators"
identified by the court included:
Vehicle Appearance:
a. low riding, or low rear end
b. obvious alterations to body
c. alterations to suspension - new adjustable air shocks
Interior of Vehicle:
a. little or no luggage and a long way from alleged home
b. luggage or spare tire on back seat
c. coolers / water jugs, fast food wrappers, coffee, bedding
d. "Bounce" or similar laundry fresheners
e. multiple air freshening devices, sprays
f. "Glad" type storage bags or aluminum foil or masking tape
Occupants:
a. overly courteous, especially if receiving a citation
b. in a hurry to leave
c. overly cautious drivers
d. signs of overt nervousness
e. won't make eye contact
f. don't "know" each other
g. after questioning the driver outside of the car stand away
from other occupants, check the story of other occupants as to
destinations, purposes of trip, length of stay, where stayed,
etc., and check for discrepancies [sic].
h. unkempt physical appearance, such as 3-day beard growth,
matted hair, fatigued, or "wired" from stimulants to stay
awake.
Everson, 474 N.W.2d at 697.
76. Id. at 702-03.
77. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451. Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion relies solely on
the magnitude of the drunken driving problem. Id. at 455-56 (Blackmun, J., concur-
458 [Vol. 11:449
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ever, simply cites U.S. Supreme Court dicta relating to interdiction
efforts at the U.S. border 78 and urine tests for federal drug agent
applicants. 79 From this, the Everson Court concludes that drug
trafficking is "a societal harm at least equal in magnitude to drunk
driving."80 Moreover, as pointed out by the dissent in \Everson,
the checkpoint operation validated in Sitz was closely related to its
justification: the interest in highway safety.8 1 A checkpoint with
the goal of intercepting drug traffickers,8 2 however, can claim no
such regulatory purpose.
iv. Unequal Treatment: Discretion and Drug Checkpoints
More generally, the Everson checkpoint illustrates the dan-
gers of unequal treatment inherent in checkpoint drug investiga-
tions. The Sitz Court recognized that the "kind of standardless and
unconstrained discretion . . . of the official in the field [must] be
circumscribed . . . "83 However, the Everson checkpoint \was
based almost solely upon the discretion of the "point man," who had
the ultimate authority upon a cursory driver's license check to de-
cide whether a particular vehicle would be directed to the "search
area."84 This "point man" was not a traffic officer, but rather was a
ring). Justice Brennan's dissent does not dispute the magnitude of the problem,
rather it disputes the necessity of checkpoint stops to address it. Id. at 456 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
78. See Everson, 474 N.W.2d. at 701 (citing U.S. v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473
U.S. 531, 538, (1985)) (recognizing "the veritable national crisis in law enforcement
caused by smuggling of illicit narcotics" in the context of border interdiction).
79. See id. (citing National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656, 668 (1989)) (characterizing drug trafficking as "one of the greatest problems
affecting the health and welfare of our population").
80. Id.
81. Id. at 705 (Levine, J. dissenting); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
663 (1979) (suggesting that "safety checks" of all vehicles at a roadblock stop which
do "not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion" are permissible). The Ever-
son Court cites Prouse in evaluating the checkpoint. Everson, 474 N.W.2d at 699.
82. The trial court in Everson found that the stated purpose of the checkpoint, a
driver's license check and vehicle inspection, was official subterfuge, and the true
purpose of the checkpoint was to intercept drug traffickers. Everson, 474 N.W.2d at
700.
83. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 454 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979)).
In U.S. v. Ramos, 733 F. Supp. 260 (S.D. Texas 1989), the court held that a stop
described as a "roving temporary checkpoint" with no constraints upon the individ-
ual narcotics officer's discretion violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 263. The
U.S. Supreme Court upheld a similar procedure in U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543 (1976), but upheld it because the checkpoint was conducted in an entirely differ-
ent context. See Strossen, supra note 28, at 307-08 (stating that the factual context
of this checkpoint involved illegal aliens, permanent checkpoints, an "administra-
tive" inspection, lack of a criminal investigation, and a finding by the Court that the
inspections were necessary to enforce immigration laws.).
84. Everson, 474 N.W.2d at 697.
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criminal investigator.8 5 Further, this criminal investigator's deci-
sion to pursue the search of a particular vehicle could be validated
by the use of an amorphous profile.86 Generally, the use of profiles
in the investigation of drug trafficking cases has been roundly criti-
cized.87 These profiles have inevitably caused intrusive detention
and investigation of innocent individuals in a variety of situa-
tions.88 The profiles themselves are often built on racial and class-
based distinctions.8 9 Furthermore, profiles such as the one docu-
mented in Everson can be used to validate the investigation of any
vehicle or individual which the officer wishes to investigate. 90 Us-
ing the Everson profile as a justification, an officer may investigate
a vehicle which either has luggage on the back seat or has no lug-
gage anywhere in the vehicle.91 An individual who is "overly cau-
tious," "overly courteous," or overtly nervous is suspect.92 Fast food
wrappers, water coolers, coffee, or bedding can also justify an
investigation. 93
85. Id. at 698. The Minnesota checkpoint also used a narcotics officer to initially
question drivers. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
86. Id. at 702 n.2. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
87. U.S. law enforcement has used profiles primarily in the context of drug traf-
fic interdiction. See Denise A. Michaux, Note, Drug Courier Profiles and the In-
fringement of Fourth Amendment Rights, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 435, 457 (1992)
("the use of drug courier profiles for [the purpose of intercepting drug traffickers]
infringes upon the Fourth Amendment rights of all citizens, whether they are actual
drug couriers or innocent travelers"); Steven K Bernstein, Fourth Amendment -
Using the Drug Courier Profile to Fight the War on Drugs, United States v. Sokolow,
109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989), 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINoLoGY 996 (1989) (criticizing Sokolow,
in which the U.S. Supreme Court generally upheld the use of drug courier profiles).
88. See Michaux, supra note 87, at 458 (noting that one drug courier profile pro-
gram caused the stop and search of innocent travelers simply because their behavior
coincided with the "profile").
89. A... flaw that has resulted in the targeting of racial minorities or
working class people during some interdiction operations stems from
discriminatory characteristics of the procedures themselves. The pro-
file used by agents to make highway stops, for instance, appears to in-
clude being a Hispanic male as a characteristic of a drug courier, and
the original airport drug courier profile in Detroit focused on Black fe-
males.... Reliance on profile characteristics based on race may bring
about a self-fulfilling prophecy. If the police look only for Black and
Hispanic drug traffickers, they will find only those drug traffickers who
happen to be Black or Hispanic.
Guerra, supra note 10, at 1147 (footnotes omitted); see also Michaux, supra note 87,
at 458 ("The possibility of race being used as a profile characteristic is frightening,
but real. A law enforcement agent probably would not admit to using race as a factor
even though he or she actually did. It is also possible that race could be one frag-
ment of the 'totality of the circumstances' which the court may consider.")






Police procedures which rely upon "nervousness" to justify fur-
ther investigation are especially disconcerting in the checkpoint
context. It is safe to say that the relationship between people of
color and the police is often fraught with apprehension, distrust,
and possibly outright fear.9 4 Checkpoint stops involve a clearly im-
posing police presence, including numerous officers, inquisitorial
questions, bright lights, drug sniffing dogs, and the obvious diver-
sion of selected vehicles off the roadway for further investigation.9 5
These features of a drug checkpoint, intimidating to any motorist,
clearly have the potential to cause fear and nervousness when that
motorist is a person of color.96
Checkpoint stops which rely on discretionary or profile criteria
are in stark contrast to Sitz drunk driving checkpoints which rely
on relatively circumscribed criteria such as driving performance
and smell of alcohol.97 When the question changes from "Is the
driver under the influence of alcohol?," to "Is the driver using or
carrying illegal drugs?" the investigating officer makes a wholly dif-
ferent set of determinations. While an investigation can be easily
confined to the indicia of alcohol intoxication, the drug checkpoint
opens up the scope of the operation to the discretion of the individ-
ual officer. This discretion invites the individual officer to investi-
gate those who "look like" drug users or traffickers.98
94. See e.g., any account of the Rodney King incident. This equation works both
ways, distorting each party's perceptions of the other. See e.g., Brent Staples, Edito-
rial Notebook; Growing Up to Fear the Law, N.Y. TIMES, March 28, 1991, at A24, Col.
1; Louis Sahagun, Police Develop Wary Courtesy, Thick Skin, L.A. TMEs, March 24,
1991, at Al, Col. 2.
95. See supra part I.
96. At least one observer has noticed the disparate impact of a Minnesota "drug
checkpoint" upon motorists of color. Barbara Foley, Letters from Readers: Drug
Searches, STAR TRmuNE (MmNzAPo s), Mar. 28, 1993, at 24A ("I've also observed
several 'drug searches' [at the checkpoint]. Each pulled over car I drove by had a
black male driver.")
97. See Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990).
98. There are two types of flaws in the systematic procedures now used to
interdict drugs that allow for the targeting of working class people and
racial minorities. First, some procedures afford individual officers un-
guided discretion to single out people who "look like" drug traffickers.
Thus officers have the discretion to exercise their personal prejudices in
determining whether an individual should be investigated. Often, of-
ficers in this position focus upon racial minorities or people who do not
appear well-dressed. Evidence shows this to be the case in with many
drug courier profile operations in which officers stop individuals based
on no information other than the officers' visual observations of the per-
son. Many drug courier cases indicate that Blacks and Hispanics may
be targeted by undercover agents simply because the color of their
skin....
Guerra, supra note 10, at 1145-46 (footnotes omitted).
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Furthermore, this discretion is necessary for all types of drug
checkpoints, not merely those which target drug traffickers. Where
a search is necessary to uncover personal amounts of drugs, law
enforcement officials necessarily make the same discretionary deci-
sions to target particular individuals.99 In the case of a drug check-
point for the purpose of targeting drug influenced drivers, the police
must arrest the individual who they suspect to be under the influ-
ence of drugs before the drug influence evaluation can be
administered. 100
The uncontrolled discretion afforded the drug checkpoint of-
ficer carries the inherent risk that an individual officer will be in-
fluenced by his or her individual biases or prejudices in selecting
persons to investigate.10 l As a result, officers may single out work-
ing class people and minorities for investigation.10 2 This danger is
inherent in the drug checkpoint, whether its purpose is to find
drugs or drug influenced drivers, and represents one of the most
serious flaws in this type of police tactic.
B. Effectiveness of Drug Checkpoints
The U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of the "effectiveness"
prong in Sitz is one of the most criticized aspects of that opinion.103
First, the Court refused to consider the possibility of a less invasive
method of apprehending drunk drivers and required no showing
that a checkpoint operation was more effective than normal stops
based upon probable cause. 10 4 Second, the number of drunk driv-
ers apprehended as a result of the Sitz checkpoint was very low.
The Sitz drunk driving checkpoint led to the arrest of 1.5% of the
99. See supra part II.A.ii; infra part II.C.
100. See supra part II.Ai; infra part II.C. While the field tests for alcohol intoxi-
cation may be administered at the checkpoint, a drug influence evaluation must be
performed at the police station, after a discretionary arrest by the checkpoint officer.
See supra part II.A.i.
101. See Guerra, supra note 10, at 1114 (arguing that "inquisitorial" methods of
law enforcement, such as drug checkpoints and profiles, allow individual officers'
bias and prejudice to color the decision of whom to investigate); see also generally
infra part III.A.
102. The perception of an individual as "suspicious" by a law officer due to that
person's race is common. See Developments in the Law: Race and the Criminal Pro-
cess, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1472, 1494-1520 (1988). There is overwhelming evidence
that racial minorities are singled out for criminal investigation. See Sheri Lynn
Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214 (1983).
103. See Strossen, supra note 28, at 300-02.
104. See Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1990). Before Sitz, courts upheld suspi-
cionless searches and seizures only upon a showing of "special need" by the govern-
ment. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1985);
Strossen, supra note 28, at 300-302, 311 n.116.
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drivers stopped.OS The Sitz Court validated this statistic as suffi-
ciently effective. 106
In comparison, the Minnesota drug checkpoint found no distri-
bution amounts of lrugs nor were any arrests made of drivers
under the influence of drugs.10 7 Seven individuals were given cita-
tions for possessing small amounts of marijuana.108 Thus, 1.1% of
the drivers passing through the Minnesota checkpoint were given
drug citations. While this figure falls within the parameters of
Sitz, it shows a rather small result and thus a questionable use of
law enforcement resources. 10 9 The fact that other law enforcement
activities are compromised as a result of checkpoints also weighs
against their "effectiveness."'1 0 Furthermore, as discussed supra,
the institution of a checkpoint stop simply for the purpose of search-
ing automobiles for personal amounts of illegal drugs is the weakest
rationale for such a checkpoint and almost certainly does not pass
the Sitz balancing test." Of the remaining two possible rationales
for instituting a drug checkpoint, apprehending individuals under
the influence and intercepting drug traffickers,112 no arrests were
made during the Minnesota checkpoint to effectuate these goals.
While the U.S. Supreme Court has essentially validated checkpoint
operations yielding very low arrest results,113 the failure of the
Minnesota checkpoint to effectuate either of the possibly permissi-
ble state interests weighs heavily against its effectiveness.
C. Intrusion Upon the Privacy of Individuals
The third prong of the balancing test that examines the intru-
sion upon an individual's privacy is divided into two separate in-
quiries: the objective and the subjective intrusion.114 The objective
intrusion upon the motorist examines the physical aspects of the
105. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455.
106. Id. The Court compared this statistic to that in Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543 (1976), in which 0.12 of the vehicles stopped at a U.S. border checkpoint with
Mexico yielded illegal aliens. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455 (citing Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
at 554).
107. 650 Cars Stopped, supra note 1, at 4B.
108. Id.
109. See supra part II.A.ii. (arguing that the use of a large scale police operation
to apprehend those with small, personal amounts of drugs is a misallocation of police
resources).
110. See Gilchrist, supra note 28.
111. See supra part II.A.ii.
112. See supra part II.A.i. (discussing the apprehension of drivers under the influ-
ence of illegal drugs, highway safety); part II.A.iii. (discussing the interception of
drug traffic).
113. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
114. Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450-451 (1990).
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seizure, while the subjective intrusion examines the effect of the
seizure upon the motorist.115 Under both of these inquiries, a drug
checkpoint constitutes a more invasive intrusion than the check-
point validated in Sitz.
The Sitz Court defined objective intrusion as the "duration of
the seizure and the intensity of the investigation."16 The average
delay to an individual motorist during the Sitz checkpoint was
twenty-five seconds, and each driver stopped was briefly examined
for signs of intoxication. 117 The organizers of the Minnesota check-
point, aware of this finding by the Sitz Court, lowered the ratio of
cars stoppedllS to preserve a thirty second average delay time.119
Although the time factor may be similar, the objective intrusion of a
drug checkpoint necessarily differs from that of an alcohol
checkpoint.
While an officer at an alcohol checkpoint only needs to briefly
question each driver, a drug checkpoint for the purpose of uncover-
ing drugs involves not only a plain view search of the interior of the
vehicle but also pressure by officers for consent to a more substan-
tial search.120 Where the goal of the checkpoint is the interdiction
of drug traffic or the location of possession amounts of drugs, the
outcome of the checkpoint will certainly be thorough searches of se-
lected automobiles. However, an alcohol checkpoint need only con-
duct conversations and field tests of individual drivers. 121 Thus a
checkpoint operation to uncover drugs will be more objectively in-
trusive by nature than an alcohol checkpoint.
Where the goal of the checkpoint is the apprehension of drug
impaired drivers, officers use the drug influence evaluation x22
rather than the standard alcohol impairment test.123 As evidenced
115. Id.; see supra notes 35-36, 40-41 and accompanying text.
116. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452.
117. Id. at 447-48.
118. At the outset, the officers at the Minnesota checkpoint were to stop every car
passing through the checkpoint, but this rate was modified to stop every third or
fourth car as traffic backed up. Telephone Interview with Lt. Dunledy, supra note 9.
119. Id.; see supra note 118 and accompanying text.
120. See Guerra, supra note 10, at 1132-33; see also supra notes 21-24 and accom-
panying text. The drug possession citations issued as a result of the Minnesota
checkpoint were issued after both plain view and consent searches. Hodges, supra
note 1, at 1A.
121. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 447.
122. A DRE officer conducts a battery consisting of twelve steps, a "drug influence
evaluation." Herland, supra note 45, at 4-5. These steps include tests used to gauge
alcohol impairment, as well as additional tests which attempt to pinpoint the partic-
ular drug or type by which the suspect is influenced. Id. These tests are quite in-
volved and must be given at the police station after the suspect has been taken into
custody. See supra part II.A.i.
123. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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by the drug influence evaluation that the Minnesota DRE officers
used, it is sufficiently more difficult to determine drug impairment
as opposed to alcohol impairment.124 Furthermore, this drug influ-
ence evaluation, although used by several law enforcement agen-
cies around the nation, has not yet been widely tested by the courts.
In contrast, law enforcement methods for ascertaining alcohol im-
pairment enjoy wide acceptance by the courts and are generally
statutorily mandated.125 Alcohol checkpoint locations are able to
utilize accurate breathalyzer testing at the site of the checkpoint,
and this information can clearly be used in the subsequent prosecu-
tion. However, an allegedly drug-impaired suspect must be ar-
rested and taken to the police station126 for an exhaustive battery
of tests which may or may not be admissible in court.127 These fac-
tors point to the conclusion that a drug influence evaluation is sub-
stantially more objectively invasive than standard police tests for
alcohol impairment, and certainly so at a checkpoint situation.
The Court, in Sitz, defines the subjective intrusion upon mo-
torists as the potential of the checkpoint operation "to generate fear
and surprise in motorists."12s The Court indicated that a night-
time, temporary police checkpoint does not impose a subjective in-
trusion upon those motorists stopped.129 The Court reached this
conclusion by comparing the Sitz checkpoint with a fixed, illegal
alien checkpoint on the U.S. border that the Court previously vali-
dated in U.S v. Martinez-Fuerte130 and finding that the subjective
intrusion from the Sitz stop was "for constitutional purposes indis-
tinguishable from the checkpoint stops we upheld in Martinez-Fu-
erte." 131 This holding has been criticized due to the obvious
differences between motorists' perceptions of a fixed border check-
point and a temporary, roving, nighttime checkpoint.132
124. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., MiNN. STAT. § 169.121 (1992) (Stating that driving with a blood al-
cohol content of over .01% is a crime in Minnesota).
126. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
127. The DRE battery of tests have not been widely adopted by courts nationwide,
nor have these tests for drug impairment been accepted by the Minnesota courts.
128. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452.
129. Id. at 452-53 (the proper measure of "subjective" intrusion is the "fear and
surprise engendered in law-abiding motorists," not those who are in danger of
arrest).
130. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976).
131. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 453.
132. The most obvious of these differences is that a roving checkpoint necessarily
relies on the element of surprise for its effectiveness. This increases the concern or
"subjective intrustion," experienced by motorists approaching the temporary check-
point. See Strossen, supra note 28, at 313-14; see also Sitz, 496 U.S. at 460-76 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting); Guerra, supra note 10, at 1136 n.118.
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The prospect of a drug checkpoint, as opposed to an alcohol
checkpoint, could certainly increase the subjective fear experienced
by a motorist. Inherent in a checkpoint for illegal drugs is the
threat of a search - of both the vehicle and the individual passen-
gers - for illegal drugs. This threat contrasts with the Sitz ideal of
a quick evaluation of the driver for alcohol intoxication. Similarly,
the threat of a drug influence evaluation, an exhaustive test in
which the subject has to demonstrate to the officer that he or she is
not 'impaired, would certainly alarm even many law-abiding motor-
ists. These considerations indicate that a drug checkpoint has an
enhanced "potential to generate fear and surprise in motorists." x33
D. Drug Checkpoints Under Federal Law - Conclusion
A drug checkpoint presents substantially different facts for re-
view than a drunken driving checkpoint. Applying the Sitz balanc-
ing test uncovers substantially different state interests and more
intrusive search techniques imposed upon all motorists seized by
such a stop. Drug checkpoints also substantially increase police
discretion as to which individuals will be focused upon, and thus
increase the likelihood of race and class based discriminations.
These factors point to the conclusion that a narcotics checkpoint
goes well beyond the criteria articulated as constitutional by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Sitz.
III. The "Narcotics Checkpoint" Violates Article I, Section
10 and Article I, Section 2 of the Minnesota
Constitution
A. Criticisms of Sitz
In upholding suspicionless stops of motorists at drunk driving
checkpoints, Sitz has been widely criticized.' 3 4 One commentator
characterized Sitz as the final step in the abdication of "meaningful
judicial review of government measures that abridge the personal
liberties protected by specific Bill of Rights guarantees . ..."135
Many of these criticisms point out that there is no evidence to sug-
gest that these checkpoints are more effective than normal police
activities based upon probable cause.136 Several commentators
have also suggested that the Court misapplied the balancing test
133. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452.
134. See Strossen, supra note 28; Guerra, supra note 10; Gilchrist, supra note 28;
4 W. LAFAvE, supra note 7, at § 10.8.
135. Strossen, supra note 28, at 288.
136. See id. at 311 n.116; Guerra, supra note 10, at 1137; Sitz, 496 U.S. at 469
(Stevens, J. dissenting). This criticism is based upon the fact that a special govern-
[Vol. 11:449
NARCOTICS CHECKPOINTS
used to evaluate the checkpoint. 137 Another commentator has gen-
erally criticized the "inquisitorial" methods of law enforcement
which the Court has upheld.138
Overall, it is clear that Sitz represents one further step in the
abdication of the current U.S. Supreme Court from its role as the
protector of individual rights. By deferring to law enforcement au-
thorities, the Court has left to the states the responsibility of sub-
mitting police procedure to meaningful judicial review.IS9
B. Sitz on Remand: State Law as the Modern Protector of
Individual Rights
On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, in Sitz v. Dept. of
State Police,140 the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the check-
point at issue, though permissible under the Federal Constitution,
was in violation of the Michigan Constitution.t41 In so doing, the
Michigan Court of Appeals independently interpreted the Michigan
Constitution to afford more protection to the individual right
against warrantless searches and seizures. 142
This decision reflects a nationwide trend towards preserving
individual rights which are not protected under the U.S. Constitu-
tion by using state constitutional provisions. 143 Similarly, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court has recently construed provisions in the
Minnesota Constitution to afford greater individual rights,'44 in-
ment need was required for a suspicionless search before Sitz. See supra note 104
and accompanying text.
137. See Guerra, supra note 10, at 1137; Sitz, 496 U.S. at 462 (Stevens, J.
dissenting).
138. Guerra, supra note 10, at 1114.
139. See 4 W. LAFAVE, supra note 7, at § 10.8.
140. 485 N.W.2d 135 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
141. Id. at 139.
142. The Michigan Court of Appeals interpreted Article I § 11 of the Michigan
Constitution, which is substantially similar to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution:
The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be
secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search
any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing
them, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation ....
MICH. CoNsT. Art. I, § 11. Sitz II, 485 N.W.2d at 139 ("we believe compelling reason
exists to interpret the Michigan Constitution as affording greater rights than those
found in the federal constitution").
143. See William Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977); Terrence Fleming and Jack Nordby, The Minne-
sota Bill of Rights: "Wrapt in the Old Miasmal Mist", 7 HAmiNE L. REv. 51, 52
(1984) ("Many United States Supreme Court justices of diverse political ideologies
have encouraged this trend.").
144. See e.g. Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828 (Minn.
1991) (holding that the Minnesota Constitution gives a motorist the right to consult
with an attorney before submitting to chemical testing for blood alcohol); State v.
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cluding protecting key rights against government search and
seizure' 45 and invalidating laws with racially discriminatory
effects. 146
C. Drug Checkpoints Under Article I, Section 10 of the
Minnesota Constitution
Minnesota has historically had a strong commitment to indi-
vidual rights.147 Furthermore, Minnesota courts have construed
article I, § 10, of the Minnesota Constitution,' 48 as offering more
protection to the individual than the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court.14 9 A strict
examination of narcotics checkpoints under Minnesota law by the
state judiciary would be consistent with these principles.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has not yet heard a highway
checkpoint case. The Minnesota Court of Appeals, however, has
heard several cases involving arrests made as a result of checkpoint
stops. In State v. Muzik,150 a pre-Sitz case, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals found that a drunken driving checkpoint violated the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.' 5 1 Muzik involved a
nighttime "safety checkpoint" which, as the court found, had the
Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990) (holding that the Minnesota Constitu-
tion protected an Amish defendant's freedom of conscience right from a state statute
which mandated display of a slow-moving vehicle emblem).
145. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 167-73 and accompanying text.
147. See generally Fleming & Nordby, supra note 143 (examining the history of
Minnesota Bill of Rights' provisions and Minnesota Supreme Court decisions which
interpret the Minnesota Constitution in an expansive manner toward individual
rights).
148. The text of article I § 10 of the Minnesota Constitution is, absent changes in
punctuation, identical to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be vio-
lated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized.
MN. CONST. art. I, § 10.
149. See O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979). In O'Connor,
the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a search warrant for an attorney's office
may not be issued when the attorney is not suspected of criminal wrongdoing, and
there is no evidence that the documents sought will be destroyed. Id. The U.S.
Supreme Court had upheld such a search in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547
(1978); see also State v. Albrecht, 465 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (declining to
accept the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule promulgated by the U.S.
Supreme Court in U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)).
150. 379 N.W.2d 599 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
151. Id. at 605.
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primary purpose of apprehending drivers under the influence of
alcohol.152
The Muzik opinion begins with the assertion that "a DWI
checkpoint is constitutional if properly conducted," i53 and uses the
Brown154 balancing test to evaluate the particular checkpoint.i55
Interpreting federal law as it existed before Sitz, the Muzik court
found that the state must demonstrate a special need for a check-
point operation.156 Furthermore, the Muzik court determined that
the checkpoint in question did not have an explicit plan to circum-
scribe the discretion of individual officers.157 Concluding that the
state had produced insufficient evidence to show "either the need
for the more intrusive method or the superiority of checkpoints to
the less intrusive alternative method of apprehension based upon
individualized suspicion,"'15 8 the Muzik court found the checkpoint
unconstitutional. ' 59
Post-Sitz evaluations of checkpoint seizures have deferred to
federal law by refusing to examine Minnesota Constitutional provi-
sions.' 6 0 These cases have specifically refused to recognize the di-
lution of Fourth Amendment rights by Sitz and have declined to
interpret the Minnesota Constitution. In Sanders v. Commissioner
of Public Safety,161 the Court of Appeals specifically refused to con-
sider checkpoint seizures under state constitutional law by defer-
ring to the lack of precedent from the Minnesota Supreme Court. 162
An examination of Minnesota law, however, finds an expan-
sive interpretation of the right against search and seizure.1 6 3 Of
particular importance in the constitutional scrutiny of a checkpoint
operation, Minnesota law extends the Terry doctrine' 64 to automo-
152. Id. at 600.
153. Id. at 602 (citation omitted).
154. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979); see supra notes 32-36 and accompanying
text.
155. Muzik, 379 N.W.2d at 599.
156. Id. at 604. See Strossen, supra note 28, at 300-02, 311 n.116.
157. Muzik, 379 N.W.2d at 603-04.
158. Id. at 604.
159. Id. at 605.
160. See State v. Larson, 485 N.W.2d 571 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); Sanders v. Com-
missioner of Public Safety, Nos. C1-89-2108, C3-90-26, 1990 WL 128305, at 2 (Minn.
Ct. App. Sept. 11, 1990); Chock v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 458 N.W.2d 692
(Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
161. Nos. C1-89-2108, C3-90-26, 1990 WL 128305 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 1990).
162. Id. See also Chock, 458 N.W.2d 692 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); Larson, 485
N.W.2d 571 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
163. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
164. The Terry doctrine allows the police in certain circumstances to question or
"stop and frisk" individuals in the absence of grounds for an arrest. See Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see generally 4 W. LAFAvE, supra note 7 at § 9. Justification
for roadblock stops does not arise from the Terry doctrine. Id, at § 9.5(b).
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bile stops, holding that the "police may not perform single, nonsys-
tematic stops without having a specific and articulable suspicion of
a violation."X6 5 Although checkpoints in general are held to be "sys-
tematic" stops and exempt from this language, it gains new signifi-
cance in the context of a drug checkpoint which gives unfettered
discretion to an individual officer to detain and investigate individ-
uals on the basis of highly subjective criteria.
The Sitz decision signalled a departure from previous Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Furthermore, drug checkpoints uncon-
stitutionally stretch even the Sitz model. Both must be examined
under article I, § 10 of the Minnesota Constitution.I6 6 First, the
validity of checkpoint operations in general as promulgated by Sitz
must be examined in light of its many and serious criticisms. Sec-
ond, the validity of drug checkpoints must be addressed. To pre-
serve meaningful judicial scrutiny of police procedures within
Minnesota, a role abdicated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sitz, ar-
ticle I, § 10 of the Minnesota Constitution must rise to the forefront.
D. Drug Checkpoints Under Article I, Section 2 of the
Minnesota Constitution
In Minnesota v. Russell,167 the Minnesota Supreme Court, in-
validated a state statute under article I, § 2 of the Minnesota Con-
stitution168 because of its discriminatory impact upon racial
165. State v. Hickman, 491 N.W.2d 673, 674 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (citing
Marben v. State Dept. of Public Safety, 294 N.W.2d 697, 699 (Minn. 1980)).
166. On August 31, 1993, as this article went to press, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals released two opinions that reached opposite conclusions in evaluating drunk
driving checkpoints under the Minnesota Constitution. In Gray v. Commissioner of
Public Safety, 1993 WL 326921 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 1993), the court held that
there were no compelling reasons to interpret article I, § 10 of the Minnesota Consti-
tution more expansively than the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and
thus, Sitz controls. Id. at *5. Reaching the opposite conclusion was Ascher v. Com-
missioner of Public Safety, 1993 WL 326926 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 1993), in which
the court held that, in the absence of empirical evidence that sobriety checkpoints
advance the public interest, these checkpoints violate article I, § 10 of the Minnesota
Constitution. Id. at *8. These conflicting decisions by the Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals have opened the door for consideration by the Minnesota Supreme Court of
drunk driving checkpoints under the Minnesota Constitution.
167. 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991). The Court in Russell invalidated a state law
which attached a heavier criminal penalty to the possession of crack cocaine (used
mainly by African-Americans) as opposed to powder cocaine (used mainly by whites).
See id.
168. This provision provides:
No member of this state shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any of the
rights or privileges secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of
the land or the judgment of his peers.
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1857, amended 1974).
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minorities. 169 In so doing, the court validated a "Minnesota ra-
tional basis" test under article I, § 2, the state equivalent of the
Equal Protection Clause, which test requires stronger scrutiny than
its federal counterpart. 170 The court enacted this standard in re-
sponse to the federal standard'17 which places "an insurmountable
burden upon the challenger [of the government action] ... [and]
also defies the fundamental tenets of equal protection." 172 The
practical effect of this enhanced scrutiny under the Minnesota Con-
stitution, as evidenced by Russell, is to invalidate government ac-
tion which is discriminatory, absent a reasonable connection
demonstrated by the government between the discrimination in
practice and the statutory goals.173
As stated above, the discretion given to individual officers
which is necessary for a drug checkpoint most certainly results in
discrimination against racial minorities and low income
individuals.174
The increasing use of drug checkpoints both in Minnesota and
nationally may provide evidence of discrimination resulting from
the wide discretion needed to effectuate such checkpoints.' 75 Thus,
the stage will be set for the evaluation of drug checkpoints under
article I, § 2 of the Minnesota Constitution. Because such a check-
point is an executive action of state and local government, these
entities must provide a "reasonable connection between the actual
... effect of the [government action] and [its] goals."176 Thus, the
government will have to show a rational relation, under the Minne-
sota test, between the racial and class based discriminations which
result from these checkpoints1 77 and the policy goals of highway
drug interdiction. Such a connection will certainly be difficult to
show, and unless the government can show a "genuine and substan-
169. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 891.
170. Id. at 888-89.
171. Under the federal standard, the challenger of government action under the
Equal Protection Clause must show that the government acted "'because of,' not
merely 'in spite of' an anticipated racially discriminatory effect." Id. at 888 n.2 (cit-
ing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987)).
172. Id. at 888 n.2.
173. Id. at 888-89 ("[Wle have required a reasonable connection between the ac-
tual, not just the theoretical, effect of the challenged classification and the statutory
goals").
174. See supra part II.A.iv.
175. Statistics are not currently available as to which motorists are more fre-
quently detained or arrested as a result of drug checkpoints.
176. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 889.
177. See supra part II.A.iv.
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tial" basis178 for the necessity of drug checkpoints, they will fail
constitutional scrutiny under article I, § 2.
IV. Conclusion
Narcotics checkpoint seizures, as effectuated by police road-
block operations such as the one conducted south of Minneapolis on
August 24, 1992, go beyond the factual criteria deemed constitu-
tional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Michigan v. Sitz, and are
therefore unconstitutional. These drug checkpoints also rely upon
the unchecked discretion of law enforcement officials, leading to ra-
cial and class based discrimination. Furthermore, due to the seri-
ous criticisms and concerns raised by Sitz and the history of
Minnesota law in preserving individual rights, Minnesota courts
should find narcotics checkpoint seizures violative of the Minnesota
Constitution.
178. Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 888.
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